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A "REPRESENTATIVE" SUPREME COURT?: THE IM-
PACT OF RACE, RELIGION, AND GENDER ON AP-
POINTMENTS. By Barbara A. Perry1 New York: 
Greenwood Press. 1991. Pp. XIV, 160. Cloth, $39.95. 
Victor H. Kramer2 
This slim, rather dull but thoroughly researched volume deals, 
as its subtitle says, with "The Impact of Race, Religion, and Gender 
on Appointments." Readers only interested in a general way in the 
subject need read only the eight page Conclusion. Those preceding 
it deal with the question whether there has been and should be a 
Catholic, Jewish, black and woman's "seat" on the Court. The au-
thor concludes that religion certainly has played a part in appoint-
ments of most of the Catholics and Jews to the Court, but that only 
in a few of those cases has it been the dominant consideration.3 The 
precise opposite seems to be true of the one black and the one wo-
man appointed to the Court at the time the book was written; here 
race and sex, respectively, were the dominant factors. The author 
notes, correctly in my view, that as the nation has matured, religion 
has played less of a role than in earlier times. 
To conclude, as the author does, that religion was rarely if ever 
the primary consideration is not to say that religion was not the 
single most important consideration in the case of the appointment 
of some Justices. In the case of Catholic Pierce Butler's appoint-
ment, the author states that "religion ... had now become one of 
the primary considerations" in choosing a Supreme Court Justice. 
The author notes that Murphy" 'was the first Roman Catholic Jus-
tice to have been appointed from explicitly religious criteria.' " 
Throughout the book the author is at pains to distinguish the 
role of religion as the "primary" factor from its representative 
"role." Too often this distinction seems unhelpful. Frequently all 
the distinction means is that, for example, the facts that Brandeis 
was a superb lawyer and had helped Wilson fashion important parts 
of his "New Freedom" were just as important as the fact that he 
I. Assistant Professor and Chairman of the Department of Government at Sweet 
Briar College, Virginia. 
2. A.B. Harvard College 1935; L.L.B. Yale Law School 1938; Professor Emeritus of 
Law, University of Minnesota. 
3. The author examines the appointments of sixteen Justices and concludes that reli-
gion, race, or sex "was a factor in all but four instances" (Taney, Cardozo, Kennedy, and 
Edward White's appointment to be an associate justice) (133). (White is considered twice; 
first as an Associate Justice and later as Chief Justice.) 
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was Jewish.4 Still, it must be noted, particularly in the case of the 
Jews selected for the Court (with the exception of Cardozo, who 
was virtually appointed by public demand), all had worked closely 
with the President prior to their appointments and could safely be 
called good friends or at least well known to the Presidents who 
appointed them.s 
The most interesting-and the boldest-position taken in the 
book is near its end and reads as follows: 
In an effort to inject some objectivity into the evaluation of 
judicial merit, I would propose the following professional and 
personal criteria for potential Supreme Court nominees: strong 
educational background, intelligence, clarity of expression, pro-
fessional ability, judicial temperament, impeccable moral charac-
ter, and diligence and conscientiousness. Although the 
individual components of such models may be difficult to define, 
they are meant to take us beyond futile exercises in which con-
servatives and liberals declare those of a similar ideological stripe 
"meritorious." 
... [I]deological and political compatibility is simply a cardinal 
fact of political life and Supreme Court appointments. It does 
not necessarily have to detract from a candidate's objective merit. 
(136) 
In my view, however, the quality which the author denigrates-
"ideological ... compatibility"-should be the most important 
qualification of all for appointments to the highest Court. 
The most important work of the Supreme Court is to utter the 
final words binding on all branches of the Government and on the 
people of the meaning of such vague constitutional phrases as "lib-
erty," "due process of law," "equal protection," and so on. The 
impact of Supreme Court decisions interpreting these words and 
phrases is enormous; the Court's decisions can contribute to civil 
disorder throughout the land,6 they can determine who will be 
elected to Congress? and they can even bring about changes in 
human reproductive processes.s To no other court in any country 
have such powers been entrusted. 
Another way of thinking about that which the author terms 
"ideological ... compatibility" is an ability to sense the direction in 
4. See Alpehus Thomas Mason, Brandeis: A Free Man's L1[e 397-404 (Viking, 1956) 
("Brandeis"). 
5. See pp. 68-69 (Cardozo); p. 72 (Frankfurter); pp. 74-75 (Goldberg); Laura Kalman, 
Abe Fortas: A Biography 199-212 (Yale U. Press, 1990). 
6. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856). 
7. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
8. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
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which the Nation should move within the limits of rational consti-
tutional interpretation. The Court at the time FDR sought to pack 
it had a totally different vision of the steps the country should take 
to surmount the Depression than did the overwhelming majority of 
citizens. Yet, arguably most or all of the Justices comprising the 
majority against FDR on the Court possessed the qualities our au-
thor lists. 9 
The quality frequently emphasized as desirable if not essential 
for Supreme Court Justices is that he or she be well versed in the 
law. w I believe that quality is very much overrated. Certainly Jus-
tice Scalia has been well trained in the law; he had served for at 
least thirteen years as a law professor and four years on the D.C. 
Circuit. 11 His opinions are masterfully argued, but I daresay a sub-
stantial proportion of the public disagrees with them. Justice Black 
had no prior judicial experience to speak of and certainly had not 
enjoyed a distinguished law practice before entering the Senate.12 
Like Justice Scalia, his opinions were masterfully reasoned and I 
daresay commanded the adherence of persons whose outlook is 
quite opposite from that of Justice Scalia. To choose sides between 
these two exceptionally bright and incisive Justices depends almost 
entirely on one's ideology. 
The notion that "ideological" compatibility should not be the 
primary or at least a very important consideration in Supreme 
Court appointments is based on an unrealistic view of the role of the 
Court in American government. The Court has increasingly been 
confronted with issues that are essentially political-that involve a 
choice based on one's vision of the kind of country that one wants 
the United States to be and to become-and therefore ideological 
considerations should be the first, not the last criterion on which a 
president should base his selection. Surely Presidents Reagan and 
Bush agree with this position. What other explanation is there for 
most of their Supreme Court appointments?IJ 
9. These Justices were: Van Devanter, McReynolds, Sutherland, Butler and Roberts. 
It could be argued that McReynolds lacked judicial temperament. See Mason, Brandeis at 
537 (cited in note 4). 
10. See Sheldon Goldman, Judicial Selection and the Qualities that Make a 'Good' 
Judge, 462 Annals of The American Academy of Political and Social Science 112, 114 (July 
1982) ("Annals"), cited for a different judicial quality in the book reviewed at note 60 on page 
17. 
II. Who's Who in America 2885-6 (Marquis, 1990). 
12. Virginia Van Der Veer Hamilton, Hugo Black: The Alabama Years (Louisiana 
State U. Press, 1972). 
13. It can not be gainsaid that a nominee to the Court should have other qualifications 
than ideological compatibility with the appointing President. The nominee should be able to 
make up his or her mind, to carry a fair share of the workload, to be capable of rational 
thought beyond that of the ordinary citizen, to be in good health, and, of course, the nominee 
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Elsewhere I have pointed out that in 1940 the Justices of the 
Supreme Court did not come from the inferior courts; they were 
former attorneys general, a former solicitor general, a secretary of 
state, law professors, a United States senator, and a private practi-
tioner.14 None had had significant experience as a judge. Today, 
five of the Justices came from the United States Courts of Appeals, 
two from state appellate courts, and two from the "number two" 
position in the Department of Justice.1s The earlier article argued 
that this shift away from persons of broad experience in government 
did not bode well for the country. Presidents would do well to in-
clude on the Court-in addition to experienced appellate judges 
from lower courts-a lawyer who has been in the cabinet or at an 
administrative agency, a person with extensive legislative experi-
ence, and a lawyer with no prior experience in government. We are 
putting on the Court too many people without that kind of breadth 
of experience that is most likely to result in a broad vision-or 
sense, if you will-of the direction in which the Court should go in 
rendering those vital opinions interpreting the Constitution. 
On the last page of the text of the book, the author discusses 
friendship with the President as a criterion for Court appointments 
and concludes that "where one stands on this issue may depend on 
the theory of constitutional analysis to which one subscribes." The 
author is referring to the fact that a president is more apt to know 
where a friend stands on the policy issues that are apt to come 
before the Court. She concludes the book with a thought with 
which it is difficult, if not impossible, to disagree: 
But presidents must carefully survey the political and judicial 
landscape to find ideologically compatible and professionally 
respected justices, for they may well participate in shaping the 
legacy of the Court and the nation.16 
must be morally honest and at least intellectually honest most of the time. To say in addition 
that a nominee should have good judgment begs the question. Compare Goldman, Annals at 
113-114 (cited in note 10). 
14. See Victor H. Kramer, Let's Send a Politician to the High Court, Legal Times 29 
(May 7, 1990). The former attorneys general were McReynolds, Stone and Murphy; the 
former solicitor general was Reed; the former law professors were Douglas and Frankfurter; 
the former Senator was Black; and Roberts was the former private practitioner. 
15. The five from the Courts of Appeals are Blackmun, Stevens, Scalia, Kennedy and 
Thomas. The two from the state appellate courts are O'Connor and Souter. The two from 
the Department of Justice are White and Rehnquist. 
16. I found several errors in the book. 
First, on page 68, Newton Baker is said to have come from Cincinnati; he came from 
Cleveland. See Webster's Biographical Dictionary 91 (G.C. Merriam Co., 1962). 
Second, two religious affiliations are mistaken. On page 87, in footnote 132, Senator 
Cohen of Maine is said to be Jewish. He describes himself as a Unitarian-Universalist in the 
Congressional Directory 87 (I 989). Deceased Senator Gruening of Alaska is also in the au-
thor's list of Jewish senators. He did not furnish any religious affiliation for his biography in 
6 Who Was Who in America 170 (1976), nor did he give any religious affiliation in the Con-
gressional Directory 7 (1968). In his autobiography (p. 16) the following appears: 
